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Abstract
The paper introduces an abstract economy with imperfect competition;
the choice of allocation takes place through an abstract mechanism, where
producers choose strategies and the outcome is (a set of) feasible allocations,
where the consumers’ choices are sustained by the market mechanism at some
prices. We show that with a wide range of assumptions on producer prefer-
ences, the equilibrium outcomes in this economy are ordinary compensated
equilibria, possibly in an economy with production externalities.
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1 Introduction
In the theory of imperfect competition, which has had a considerable development
in recent years, the problem of integrating imperfectly competitive behavior into a
generel equilibrium framework still has not found a satisfactory solution. Since the
seminal contribution of Negishi (1962), there has been a steady growing literature on
this fleld (see, e.g., the survey in Hart, 1985) but many of the fundamental questions
in this fleld remain unanswered. Thus, while the details of strategic behavior with
flrms has been treated in a still more sophisticated way, our understanding of the
way in which this behavior flts into the rest of the economy with its more standard
mechanisms is not yet complete.
There are, of course, good reasons for this lagging behind of our understanding
of this fleld, which have its own particular features. Thus, it must be considered
whether flrms take into consideration the full impact on the economy of their actions
{ giving rise to the so-called objective demand approach { or whether they act ac-
cording to a perceived version of this impact, to me modelled as subjective demand.
But even then, some fundamental choices in the modelling of flrms’ behavior remain,
connected with the objectives of flrms. When competition is incomplete, maximiza-
tion of proflts is no longer an unambiguous way of furthering shareholder interests;
as a matter of fact, proflt maximization does not even always make sense, as it mas
shown already by Gabszewicz and Vial (1972), the rule of normalization of prices
may matter for the ensuing equilibrium; thus, the choice of numeraire commodity
in°uences the flnal allocation obtained in the economy.
In this paper, we consider some alternative formulations of the flrms’ objective.
The flrst one is a rather intuitive one: Firms will act in such a way that there no
alternative action would result in a better flnal outcome for its shareholders. This
clearly, is a rather weak criterion; there is no advantage of being a large or even a
dominating shareholder. However, as a flrst approach it seems uncontroversial, at
least as a flrst condition on flrms’ behavior.
The second objective to be considered in this paper is that of shareholders’
real wealth maximization, proposed by Dierker and Grodal (1996). Here the flrm
chooses its actions in so that there is no alternative choice with the property that
the total wealth of its shareholders resulting from this choice is greater than the
value of their consumption at the original outcome (so that at the new prices all
shareholders could realize a better flnal consumption after suitable redistribution of
income). This objective may be considered as a reflnement of the previous one, and
at the same time it appears as more intuitively fltted to the situation of transmitting
shareholders’ preferences to the flrm.
With either of the above two assumptions in the flrm’s objectives, we consider the
set of equilibria under imperfect competition and compare the allocations obtained
by those obtainable under perfect competition. In both cases, it turns out that
under suitable assumptions of well-behavedness, these allocations are compensated
equilibria, that is they could be obtained in the underlying economy by perfect
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competition after some redistribution of income. This result, which of course should
be considered in relation to their assumptions, may be interpreted as pointing to
some remaining shortcomings of the formulations of flrms’ objectives; it does not
quite correspond to our intuitive conception of imperfect competition that it should
end up with the same result as perfect competition, or difier only in respect to
distribution of incomes.
In the construction of our model of an economy with imperfect competition,
we have chosen not to be speciflc on the actual choices of the flrm, but rather to
formalize the imperfect competition as an abstract game with the flrms as players,
where the combined strategy choices result in allocations and prices in the underlying
economy. Thus, the imperfectly competitive competition is treated as sort of a
\black box", without explicit formulation of the way, in which strategies of flrms
in°uence the market and its functioning. The advantage of this approach is that we
do not have to be speciflc on whether flrms choose quantities or prices or some third
strategic variable; the standard models of Cournot and Bertrand competition come
out as special cases.
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we introduce the basic model
which consists of (1) a basic framework for general equilibrium analysis, (2) a method
of determining flnal allocation as a result of the simultaneous choices of the imper-
fectly competing flrms, in this paper called a mechanism, and (3) an assignment of
preferences to flrms. In the following sections, we equilibria of the model with par-
ticular speciflcations of the preferences of flrms; in section 3 we discuss shareholder
welfare maximization, and in section 4 we look at shareholder real wealth maximiza-
tion by flrms. In section 5, we subsume the previous results considering a slightly
more general situation allowing for production externalities, and in this framework
we derive our main result, which issection 5, we present the general equivalence the-
orem for imperfect competition (with objective demand). We conclude with some
flnal remarks in section 6.
2 Imperfect competition economies
In this section, we introduce the basic notions to be used in the sequel. Since we dis-
cuss imperfectly competitive behavior in general equilibrium, there are three basic
ingredients: flrst of all, we need the basic framework of general equilibrium theory
(for considering the outcome of imperfect competition), secondly, we need a notion
of strategies for the imperfect competitors (deflning the rules of the imperfect com-
petition), and thirdly, we must introduce objectives of the imperfect competitors,
since this is no longer trivial.
(1) We start with the flrst ingredient, deflning abstract economies for general
equilibrium analysis.
Let E = (Xi; »´ i; !i)mi=1; (Yj)nj=1; ((µij)mi=1)nj=1) be an abstract economy in the
sense of Debreu (1959). Here,
3
{ for i 2 f1; : : : ;mg, the triple (Xi; »´i; !i) denotes a consumer with
{ consumption set Xi ‰ Rl,
{ preferences »´i ‰ Xi £Xi, and
{ initial endowment !i 2 Rl, for j 2 f1; : : : ; ng,
{ for j 2 f1; : : : ; jg,
{ Yj ‰ Rl is the production set of flrm j, and
{ for (i; j) 2 f1; : : : ;mg £ f1; : : : ; ng, µi;j 2 [0; 1] denote the proflt share of
consumer i in flrm j, where
Pm
i=1 µij = 1 for all j.
The economy is supposed to satisfy the standard assumptions of general equilib-
rium theory (cf. e.g. Green, MasColell, Whinston (1995) for details):
The economy E = ((Xi; »´i; !i)mi=1; (Yj)nj=1; (µij)mi=1 nj=1) satisfles the following:
(i) For each consumer i, Xi is nonempty, closed, convex, bounded from below, and
satisfles Xi+R
l
+ ‰ Xi, and »´i is complete preorder on Xi which is continuous,
monotonic, and convex;
(ii) for each producer j, the set Yj is closed, convex, and contains 0 2 Rl;
(iii) there are xi 2 Xi, i = 1; : : : ;m, yj 2 Yj, j = 1; : : : ; n, such that Pmi=1 xi =P
i=1 yj +
Pm
i=1 !i:
An allocation in E is an array z = (x1; : : : ; xm; y1; : : : ; yn) 2 R(m+n)l. The
allocation z is feasible if
xi 2 Xi; i = 1; : : : ;m; yj 2 Yj; j = 1; : : : ; n;
mX
i=1
xi •
mX
i=1
!i +
nX
j=1
yj:
By Assumption 1.(iii), the set of feasible allocations in E is nonempty. We let A
denote the set of feasible allocations in E .
A price system is a non-negative l-vector p 2 Rl+nf0g; the demand of consumer
i with income wi at the price p is
»i(p; wi) = fxi 2 Xi j p ¢ xi • wi; x0i ´i xi ) p ¢ x0i > wig:
Let F denote the set of allocation-price pairs (z; p) such that z 2 A, and for each i,
xi 2 »i(p; p ¢ xi)
(here ¢ denotes the inner product in Rl). Thus, (z; p) belongs to F if the allocation
is feasible and the consumers’ bundles are best in their preference orderings among
the bundles which cost no more at the price system p.
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(2) Now we turn the second category of deflnitions, those pertaining to the im-
perfectness of competition between flrms in the economy E . Since we do not want
to commit ourselves to a particular institutional framework, we take an abstract
approach, assuming that flrms choose strategies which through the interplay of the
market results in allocation-price pairs in F . Of course, even so we are restricting
ourselves: The fact that strategies will be chosen with a view to the resulting allo-
cation(s) means that what we use an objective demand approach (cf. Hart (1985)).
Thus for each j, let §j be an abstract strategy space, and let § =
Qn
j=1 §j. We
deflne a mechanism as a non-deterministic game form ¡ = ((§j)
n
j=1;F ; …) where
… is a correspondence … : § ! F taking strategy arrays ¾ = (¾1; : : : ; ¾n) to sets
of allocation-price pairs (z0; p0) 2 F . The choice of a non-deterministic game form
rather than an ordinary game form (for each strategy array we assume that there
may be several allocation-price pairs in the outcome set) is made in order not to
exclude the most obvious particular cases such as Cournot-competition, cf. below.
One of our reasons for the abstract approach to imperfect competition is that we
do not need to commit ourselves to either prices or quantities as strategic variables
of the flrms. Thus, the prices of the output commodoties of the flrm or its actual
sales may be determined only as part of the flnal outcome of the strategy choices
of themselves and their competitors. Thus the mechanism re°ects that prices and
quantities adjust as a response to the strategic choices of the flrms until a price-
guided allocation in F prevails.
Example 2.1 (Cournot competition) Suppose that each flrm j chooses a net trade
y^j 2 Yj to be sent to the market, accepting the market prices resulting from this;
formally, the strategy space of flrm j in the mechanism ¡ is then the set of all pro-
duction plans y^j 2 Yj, and the outcome of the mechanism is then the set of all Walras
equilibria of the economy E [y^1; : : : ; y^n] = ((Xi; »´i; !i)mi=1; (fy^jg¡Rl+)nj=1; (µi)mi=1 mj=1).
Thus, each flrm chooses as strategy a commitment to a certain net production, and
the outcomes may either be considered (as above) as the Walras equilibria of the
economy with the corresponding simplifled production sets, of alternatively, as the
Walras equilibria of the exchange economy where each consumer i has endowment
!i +
Pn
j=1 µij y^j.
It might be noticed that the deflnition of ¡ as given above is not yet complete,
since we need a rule for determination of outcome when y^1; : : : ; y^n are such that
E [y^1; : : : ; y^n] has no Walras equilibria; a precondition for this to happen (given As-
sumption 1) is that
mX
i=1
!i +
nX
j=1
[fy^jg ¡Rl+] \
nX
i=1
intXi = ;
(intuitively, the choices of production plans proposed by the flrms are such that the
demand for inputs exceed the available quantities). To complete the deflnition of the
mechanism, some rationing of flrm’s demand for inputs might be added; however,
the set of equilibria (in the sense to be developed below) will depend on the precise
way of deflning such a rationing, and we shall not enter into this topic here.
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Example 2.2 (Bertrand competition in one-commodity producing flrms) Assume
that each flrm j produces a single output commodity h(j); let L1 ‰ f1 : : : ; lg be
the set of commodities produced by some flrm, and let L2 be the remainder, and for
each h 2 L1, let Nh = fj j h(j) = hg.
The following mechanism captures some features of competition a la Bertrand:
The strategies of flrm j are functions ¾j : R
l¡1
+ ! R+ determining a price of
the output commodity h(j) as a function of the prices of all other commodities. To
determine the outcome function, we deflne for each strategy array (¾1; : : : ; ¾n) the set
of outcomes as the set of allocation-price pairs (z; p) = (x1; : : : ; xm; y1; : : : ; yn; p) 2 F
for which the following hold: For each h 2 L1, there is j⁄(h) 2 f1; : : : ; ng with
¾j⁄(h)(p) = ph = min
j2Nh
¾j(p);
then (z; p) is a feasible allocation-price pair in the economy ((Xi; »´i; !i)mi=1; ( ~Yj)nj=1;
(µi)
m
i=1
m
j=1), where
~Yj =
(
Yj if j = j
⁄(h) for some h 2 L1,
¡Rl+ otherwise;
thus, for each commodity h, a flrm quoting the lowest prices gets the whole demand,
and the remaining flrms producing this commodity get nothing.
It is seen that even in the one-output case considered here, a mechanism which
captures some features of Bertrand competition becomes somewhat complicated
(and we have not addressed the existence problem involved in its deflnition). The
mechanism presupposes that the flrm with the smallest price on its output will get
the market in the sense that the remaining competitors can only carry through a
trivial production. This is a somewhat drastic assumption in the context of Bertrand
competition; in the literature on partial equilibria, there is usually a rationing as-
sumption involved, whereby competitors with prices higher than the lowest in the
market do get some demand, at least in the cases where the flrm with the lowest
price cannot satisfy all of the demand. We have chosen the above simpler { and
perhaps less realistic { formulation in order to avoid outcomes which are traded
simultaneously at several difierent price systems, since in that case outcome would
no longer belong to F .
(3) To complete our formal framework, having introduced game forms, we need
a notion of preferences of producers over outcomes. At present, we shall introduce
these preferences formally as correspondences 'j : F ! F , assigning to each fea-
sible allocation-price pair (z; p) all the allocation-price pairs (z0; p0) considered by
flrm j to be superior to (z; p). The preferences of flrm j should presumable re-
°ect the shareholders’ interest, but at this point we are not yet committed to any
interpretation. In the following sections we consider several possibilities.
Now we have completed the introduction of our model; the array (E ;¡; ('j)nj=1)
is called an economy with imperfect competition, and the logical next step is to
deflne equilibria for this economy.
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Definition 2.3 Let (E ;¡; ('j)nj=1) be an economy with imperfect competition. An
equilibrium in (E ;¡; ('j)nj=1) is an array (z; p; ¾), where
(1) (z; p) 2 …(¾),
(2) ¾ is a Nash equilibrium of (¡; ('j)
n
j=1) in the sense that there is no j 2
f1; : : : ; ng and (z0; p0) 2 'j(z; p) such that
(z0; p0) 2 …(¿j; ¾¡j)
for some ¿j 2 §j where (¿i; ¾¡j) is the strategy array obtained from ¾ by
replacing ¾j with ¿j.
The deflnition of an equilibrium is almost self-explanatory, only the standard
concept of a Nash equilibrium has had to be slightly extended to be useful in our
context of non-deterministic game forms: We demand that for the given choice
of allocation-price pair in the outcome set belonging to the equilibrium strategy
array, no individual change of strategy can lead to an outcome set containing an
allocation-price pair considered better in the preferences of this flrm. Thus, we
work with what may be called ‘optimistic beliefs’ with respect to the selection of
the particular allocation-price pair from the outcome set.
Since deviating flrms have optimistic beliefs, the notion of equilibrium (where
there are no deviating flrms) is correspondingly strong. However, this problem is
more apparent than real, since in applications, it seems quite often to be the case
that if there is a deviation leading to somewhat preferred according to our deflnition,
then there is also such a deviation for which the outcome set is a singleton; we return
to this in the concluding remarks.
In the following two sections, we consider possible speciflcations of the prefer-
ence correspondences 'j introduced above, and we show that in both cases the
equilbria obtained are among some which were known and studied already (with no
mentioning of imperfect competition).
3 Equilibria under shareholder welfare maximiza-
tion
In the present section we show that if preferences of each flrm re°ect the interests of
its shareholders in a weak sense, then the allocation associated with an equilibrium
is Pareto optimal; indeed, the price system at which consumers buy their flnal
bundles deflne a compensated equilibrium, meaning that the imperfectly competitive
production sector may efiect a redistribution of incomes as compared to the perfectly
competitive situation, but otherwise has little impact on resource allocation.
To obtain this result we need a weak smoothness assumption on preferences
(namely unique support of sets of strictly preferred bundles). For i 2 f1; : : : ;mg a
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consumer, »´ i a preference on Xi, and xi 2 Xi, we use the notation Pi(xi) = fx0i 2
Xi j x0i ´i xig.
For all i and xi 2 Xi, the set
fp 2 Rl+ j x0i 2 P (xi)) p ¢ x0i > p ¢ xig
is a half-line in Rl.
Next, we turn to the flrms’ preferences on allocation-price pairs. In all that
follows, we consider preferences which depend only on the allocation component,
not on the price. Straightforward as such a restriction may seem, it does rule out
some obvious objectives of the flrms (such as proflt maximization) which in certain
contexts will induce difierent preferences on allocations depending on the associated
prices (cf. Gabszewicz and Vial (1972)). The preferences to be used in the following
are such that e.g. the choice of rule for price normalization will have no impact on
the equilibrium selection.
As stated in the previous section, it would seem reasonable that preferences of
the flrms should re°ect shareholder preferences in some way. A precondition for
this is that if shareholder unanimity prevails about the ranking of two allocations,
then ranking of the flrm should be in accordance with this unanimous ranking of its
shareholders.
For each flrm j 2 f1; : : : ; ng, the preference relation 'uj satisfy the following
condition: If (z; p); (z0; p0) 2 F are such that x0i 2 Pi(xi) for all i with µij > 0 then
(z0; p0) 2 'uj (z; p).
In the following, we shall be interested in economies with imperfect competition
(E ;¡; ('uj )nj=1) which satisfy Assumptions 1 { 3. We note that the assumption on
flrms’ preferences is not very restrictive, since it amounts only to price-independence
and respect of shareholder unanimity. Even so, it turns out that the set of equilibria
is rather severely restricted; below it is shown that the set of equilibria correspond to
the set of compensated equilibria of the original economy. Recall that a compensated
equilibrium of the economy E is a pair (z; p) 2 F such that the production plans
of the allocation z = (x1; : : : ; xm; y1; : : : ; ym) are proflt maximizers at the prices p,
that is
p ¢ yj ‚ p ¢ y0j; all y0j 2 Yj:
If (z; p) is a compensated equilibrium then z is Pareto optimal.
To explain the nature of the equivalence result to follow, consider for a while
a feasible allocation z = (x1; : : : ; xm; y1; : : : ; yn) in the economy E . Suppose that
there is a flrm j, and a bundle x0i 2 Pi(xi) for each i with µij > 0, that is for each
shareholder in flrm j, such that the aggregate change in consumption
P
i:µij>0(x
0
i¡xi)
corresponds to a change in the production of flrm j, that isX
i:µij>0
(x0i ¡ xi) 2 Yj ¡ fyjg;
if allocation is carried out by direct delivery (rather than through the interplay of the
market), and if flrms’ preferences satisfy Assumption 3 above, so that they respect
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shareholder unanimity, then (z; p) cannot be an equilibrium choice. In our context,
we need to go beyond the notion of direct improvement, since flrms do not improve
their shareholders’ situation by direct delivery of goods, but rather by choosing
another strategy in the mechanism which through the interplay of the market will
result in other bundles for the consumers.
For our flrst approach we investigate what will happen if the mechanism ¡ is
su–ciently °exible to allow for the same type of improvements that could be carried
through under direct delivery:
The mechanism ¡ has the following property: If (z; p) 2 …(¾) is a feasible
allocation-price pair with
(Yj ¡ fyjg) \
0@ X
µij>0
[Pi(xi)¡ fxig]
1A 6= ;
(such that some unanimous improvement for shareholders could be obtained by a
change in j’s production, everything else being equal) then there exist ¿j 2 §j and
(z0; p0) 2 …(¿j; ¾¡j) such that x0i 2 Pi(xi) for all i with µij > 0.
Now we may state and prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1 Let (E ;¡; ('uj )nj=1) be an economy with imperfect competition satis-
fying Assumptions 1 { 4.
If (z; p; ¾) is an equilibrium then (z; p) is a compensated equilibrium in E.
Proof: Suppose that (z; p; ¾) with z = (x1; : : : ; xm; y1; : : : ; yn) is an equilibrium in
in (E ;¡; ('uj )nj=1); then
(Yj ¡ fyjg) \
0@ X
i:µij>0
[Pi(xi)¡ fxig]
1A = ;
for all j. Indeed, suppose that there were x0i 2 Pi(xi) for each i with µij > 0 such thatP
i:µij>0(x
0
i ¡ xi) = y0j ¡ yj for some y0j 2 Yj. By Assumption 4 there is ¿j 2 §j and
(z00; p00) 2 …(¿j; ¾¡j) such that x00i 2 Pi(xi) for each i with µij > 0. By Assumption
3, the latter condition on (z00; p00) implies that (z00; p00) 2 'uj (z; p), and we have a
contradiction since (z; p) is an equilibrium.
Since Yj ¡fyjg and Pi:µij>0 Pi(xi)¡fxig are both convex sets, and 0 belongs to
the flrst of the sets while the second set is open, there is p0 2 Rl, p 6= ;, such that
p0 ¢ y • 0; y 2 Yj ¡ fyjg;
p0 ¢ x > 0; x 2 Pi(xi)¡ fxig:
From the monotonicity properties of »´i (Assumption 1.(i)) we infer that p0 2 Rl+.
Since p0¢Pi:µij>0 ~xi > p0¢Pi:µij>0 xi whenever ~xi 2 Pi(xi) for each i with µij > 0, we
conclude that p0 is a support of Pi(xi) at xi for all i with µij > 0. By the smoothness
Assumption 2 (and the price independence in Assumption 3(i)), we may assume
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that p = p0. It follows then that p ¢ y • p ¢ yj. Since j was chosen arbitrarily,
this proflt maximization condition holds for every flrm, and consequently (z; p) is a
compensated equilibrium.
Remark 3.2 Note that in the proof of Theorem 1 only Assumption 2 on preferences
of consumers is needed, so there is no need to assume that »´ i is a monotone,
continuous, total preorder for all i.
If preferences of flrms not only respect shareholder unanimity but are actually
deflned by this condition, that is if
(z0; p0) 2 'uj (z; p), [x0i 2 Pi(xi) all i with µij > 0]; (1)
then the converse of Theorem 1 holds, at least under the additional assumption
of universal shareholding (every consumer has shares in every flrm). In this case,
every compensated equilibrium is obtainable as an equilibrium of the economy with
imcomplete competition (E ;¡; ('uj )nj=1).
Theorem 3.3 Let (E ;¡; ('uj )nj=1) be an economy with imperfect competition satis-
fying Assumptions 1 and 4, such that µij > 0 for all i and j, and assume that for
each j, the correspondence 'uj satisfles (1) above.
If (z; p) 2 F is a compensated equilibrium of E with (z; p) 2 …(¾) for some ¾ 2 §,
then (z; p; ¾) is an equilibrium of (E ;¡; ('uj )nj=1).
Proof: Suppose that (z; p) 2 …(¾) is a compensated equilibrium. If (z; p; ¾) is not
an equilibrium of (E ;¡; ('uj )nj=1), then there must be some j and ¿j 2 §j such that
…(¿j; ¾¡j) contains an allocation price pair (z0; p0) 2 'uj . Applying (1) and the fact
that µij > 0 for all j, we get that x
0
i 2 Pi(xi) for all i. Since z0 2 A we have that z0
is a Pareto improvement of z, contradicting that z is Pareto optimal. We conclude
that (z; p; ¾) is an equilibrium.
The results of this section show that equilibria under conditions of incomplete
competition are to be found among the allocations which are also studied in the
context of perfect competition. In a certain sense, then, imperfect competition does
not add anything new as far as the set of allocations obtainable in equilibrium is
concerned. Also, Theorem 2 indicates that imperfect competition may give a rather
large set of allocations as equilibrium outcomes.
Clearly, these results depend on the assumptions, and some of them are rather
strong. We shall relax most of them in due course, getting somewhat less sharp
results as a consequence. The next section represents a small step in this direction.
4 Equilibria under real wealth maximization
In this section, we show that results similar to those of Theorem 1 can be obtained
also with a somewhat weaker assumption on the mechanism than that stated as
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Assumption 4 in the previous section. This assumption states that there is a close
connection between choice of production plans in the flrms and choices of strategies.
In the version of the assumption stated below this connection is still present but in
a weaker sense: only the feasible directions of change in production are sustained
by strategy choices.
Before stating the assumption, we need some notions of non-smooth analysis, in
particular that of a tangent cone, cf. Clarke (1983): A vector v 2 Rl is a tangent of
C ‰ Rl at x 2 C if for every sequence (x”)1”=1 in C converging to x and for every
sequence (t”)
1
”=1 of nonnegative reals decreasing to 0, there is a sequence (v”)
1
”=1 in
Rl converging to v such that x” + t”v” 2 C. The set of tangents of C at x is denoted
by TC(x) and is called the tangent cone of C at x.
Let (z; p) 2 F be an allocation-price pair, and let ¾ 2 § be such that (z; p) 2
…(¾). If Cj(z; p; ¾) ‰ (Rl)n is the set of productions obtained in allocation-price
pairs (z0; ¾0) 2 …(¿ tj ; ¾¡j) for some ¿j 2 §j, then
(0; : : : ; 0; y0j; 0; : : : ; 0) 2 TCj(z;p;¾)(y1; : : : ; yn);
for each y0j 2 Yj, where (0; : : : ; 0; y0j; 0; : : : ; 0) is the vector in (Rl)n with 0 everywhere
and yj at the places corresponding to flrm j.
The assumption states that locally, that is at any allocation-price pair with
corresponding strategy choices, a flrm can change its flnal production in any feasible
direction, which here means in any direction which is in the tangent cone of Y ¡fyjg
at yj, by a unilateral change of strategy; moreover, this can be efiectuated in such a
way that the flnal production plans of the other flrms are afiected only slightly. Thus,
the assumption gives for each producer j a wide variety of alternative production
plans, at least in a neighbourhood of the actual choice. In the case of Cournot
competition with quantity-choosing flrms (Example 1 above), this is a rather natural
assumption, but if the flrm chooses prices rather than quantities, it is less obvious
that every (or at least something nearby) production plan is an obtainable choice
no matter what the other flrms have chosen, given that the production is assumed
actually to satisfy the consumer demand resulting from the strategy choice. The
restrictiveness of this assumption in general models should of course be taken into
consideration when assessing the results to be presented.
Instead of repeating the analysis in the previous section with this assumption
instead of assumption 4, we consider a situation where flrms’ preferences are not
derived from shareholder unanimity but depend on shareholder real wealth. An
intuitive reason for this change of formulation is that with shareholder unanimity,
a decision among shareholders based on their flnal bundles of consumption is called
for, whereas decisions involving only the flnancial position of shareholders seem
somewhat simpler. Formally, we demand that flrms should choose strategy in such
a way that no other strategy could give a Pareto improvement for shareholders,
when these are allowed to redistribute the proflts of the flrm in any way desired.
Formally, this amounts to the following:
Firm preferences 'rj , j = 1; : : : ; n, are shareholder compatible in the following
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sense: Let (z; p) 2 F , and suppose that (z0; p0) = (x01; : : : ; x0m; y01; : : : ; y0n; p0) is such
that X
i:µij>0
p0 ¢ (xi ¡ !i) <
X
i:µij>0
nX
j=1
µijp
0 ¢ y0j:
Then (z0; p0) 2 'rj(z; p).
The assumption states that if at the allocation-price pair (z0; p0), the aggregate
wealth of flrm j’s shareholders is large enough to allow these shareholders to buy
the bundles which they obtained at allocation-price pair (z; p), then flrm j consider
(z0; p0) as better than (z; p). Note that in our interpretation of the assumption, the
flrm has the opportunity of redistributing the shareholder incomes, or, alternatively,
we assume that shareholders may agree on income transfers conditioned on a change
of the strategy of the flrm.
Remark 4.1 If (z0; p0) 2 “j(z; p), that is if (z0; p0) is better than (z; p) from the
point of view of real wealth maximization, then each shareholder i of flrm j can
buy something better than xi at the prices p
0 and after a suitable redistribution of
shareholder incomes; this does not mean however that the bundle x0i is necessarily
better than xi for all i, since here we work with potential rather than actual Pareto
improvements.
With Assumption 3 on flrms’ preferences and Assumption 4 on the well-behavedness
of the mechanism replaced by Assumptions 6 and 5, respectively, we still get a coun-
terpart of Theorem 1, reducing equilibria of the economy with imperfect competition
to ordinary compensated equilibria of the underlying economy:
Theorem 4.2 Let (E ;¡; ('rj)nj=1) be an economy with imperfect competition satis-
fying Assumptions 1,2,5, and 6, and such that µij > 0 for all i and j.
If (z; p; ¾) be is an equilibrium then (z; p) is a compensated equilibrium in E.
Proof: Let j 2 f1; : : : ; ng and suppose that
y0j ¡ yj 2
ˆ
mX
i=1
[Pi(xi)¡ fxig]
!
for some y0j 2 Yj. Then, by Assumption 6(ii), the vector (0; : : : ; 0; y0j ¡ yj; 0; : : : ; 0)
belongs to TCj(z;p;¾)(y1; : : : ; yn). Using the deflnition of tangents, this means that for
any sequence ¿ ”j such for each ” …(¿
”
i ; ¾¡j) contains an allocation-price pair (z
” ; p”)
with (y”1 ; : : : ; y
”
n) converging to (y1; : : : ; yn) and any sequence (t
”)1”=1 decreasing to 0,
there is a sequence (~y”1 ; : : : ; ~y
”
n)
1
”=1 in (R
l)n converging to (0; : : : ; 0; y0j ¡ yj; 0; : : : ; 0),
such that y”k + t
” ~y”k 2 Cj(z; p; ¾) for all ” and k = 1; : : : ; n.
We claim that there is a choice of sequence (t”)1”=1 such that
nX
k=1
(y”k + t
” ~y”k) 2
ˆ
mX
i=1
[Pi(xi)¡ fxig]
!
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for some ”; then for each sequence (
P
k=1 ~y
”
k)
1
”=1 from the complement of
Pm
i=1[Pi(xi)¡
fxig] and each sequence (t”)1”=1 we would have
(
nX
k=1
~y”k) + t
”(
nX
k=1
y”k) =2
ˆ
mX
i=1
[Pi(xi)¡ fxig]
!
;
so that y0j ¡ yj must be a tangent of the complement of
Pm
i=1[Pi(xi)¡ fxig] at xi, a
contradiction, which proves our claim.
We conclude that for each „” there is ” > „”, a strategy choice ¿ ”j and allocation-
price pair (z” ; p”) 2 …(¿ ”j ; ¾¡i) such that
nX
k=1
[y”k ¡ yk] =
mX
i=1
[x”i ¡ xi] 2
mX
i=1
[Pi(xi)¡ fxig]:
If p” ¢ (Pmi=1 x”i ) • p” ¢ (Pmi=1 xi) for all ”, then, arguing as above, we would have that
y0j ¡ y0j belongs to the complement of
Pm
i=1[Pi(xi) ¡ fxig], a contradiction. Thus,
there is ” such that
p” ¢ (
mX
i=1
x”i ) > p
” ¢ (
mX
i=1
xi):
This means that …(¿ ”j ; ¾¡j) contains a price-allocation pair in '
r
j(z; p), contradicting
that (z; p; ¾) is an equilibrium.
We conclude that
[Yj ¡ fyjg] \
ˆ
mX
i=1
[Pi(xi)¡ fxig]
!
= ;
for every j. By separation of convex sets together with the fact that Pi(xi) ¡ fxig
is uniquely supported at 0 by p (according to Assumption 2), we have that yj
maximizes p¢y on Yj. Since j was arbitrary, we conclude that (z; p) is a compensated
equilibrium in E .
The result shows that equilibria with imperfect competition will result in com-
pensated equilibria also under shareholder real wealth maximization, even with the
weaker assumptions on the mechanism. What is shown by this result and that of the
previous section is that under imperfect competition (of the \objective demand" type
considered here), the allocation-price pairs obtainable are well-studied compensated
equilibria of the economy considered, a result which indicates that the theory may
have little to add to our understanding of the functioning of economies under other
conditions than perfect competition (since our version of imperfect competition just
simulates the well-known case).
On the other hand, the results depend on our assumptions, among which in-
particular those specifying properties of the mechanism (Assumptions 4 and 5) are
di–cult to interpret in general. Therefore, we turn to a more general formulation
of the previous equivalence results, where we may avoid assumptions on the mech-
anism.
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5 A general equivalence result
The conclusions of Theorems 1 and 3, stating that equilibria of imperfect competi-
tion economies with objective demand are actually ordinary compensated equilibria,
are quite strong, reducing as they do the class of allocations obtained in imperfectly
competitive equilibria to a subset of those obtained in ordinary competitive equilib-
ria, but on the other hand they depend heavily on the assumptions, some of which
are rather restrictive. Thus, we would like to avoid the universal shareholder prop-
erty which is in the assumptions of both Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 in order to
cover also economies with a more restricted ownership of the flrms. And, as already
mentioned, the assumptions on the mechanism, whether stated as Assumption 4 or
as Assumption 5, are posing rather heavy restrictions on the setup of the ecconomies
with imperfect competition.
In the present section, we present a generalized version of the theorem in the
previous section. The two restrictive features of Theorem 1 mentioned above are
done away with. This of course does not come for free, and the result obtained is not
a straightforward generalization of Theorem 1; instead of identifying difierent sets
of allocation-price pairs in the same underlying economy, we shall introduce another
economy E^ associated with the original economy E , and then the equilibria with
imperfect competition of E are ordinary compensated equilibria of E^ . However, the
main message is retained { equilibria with imperfect competition are not new objects
but belong to the well-studied class of competitive equilibria, when the choice sets
are deflned suitably.
We need an extension of the standard general equilibrium model, so that the
sets of feasible production plans available to each flrm may depend on the actual
allocation. Formally, an economy with production externalities is an array E^ =
(Xi; »´i; !i)mi=1; A^; (Vj)nj=1((µij)mi=1)nj=1), where
{ (as previously) for i 2 f1; : : : ;mg, the triple (Xi; »´i; !i) denotes a consumer
with consumption set Xi ‰ Rl, preferences »´i ‰ Xi £Xi, and initial endow-
ment !i 2 Rl, for j 2 f1; : : : ; ng,
{ a set A^ ‰ Rl(m+n) of feasible allocations (x1; : : : ; xm; y1; : : : ; yn), and for each
j 2 f1; : : : ; ng
{ Vj : A^ ! Rl(m + n) is a correspondence assigning to each feasible allo-
cation a set of displacements of flnal allocation available to flrm j,
{ for i 2 f1; : : : ;mg, µi;j 2 [0; 1] denotes the proflt share of consumer i in
flrm j, where
Pm
i=1 µij = 1 for all j.
In an economy with production externalities, the result of a change in the choice
of production by some flrm j is a change in allocation as described by the corre-
spondences Vj.
We shall need a counterpart of the well-behavedness assumption for the general
case.
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The economy with production externalities
E^ = ((Xi; »´i; !i)mi=1; Y^ ; (Vj)nj=1; ((µij)mi=1)nj=1)
satisfles the following:
(i) For each consumer i, Xi is nonempty, closed, convex, bounded from below, and
satisfles Xi+R
l
+ ‰ Xi, and »´i is complete preorder on Xi which is continuous,
monotonic, and convex;
(ii) the set A^ is closed, convex, and nonempty, and
(ii.a) for each i and z = (x1; : : : ; xm; y1; : : : ; yn) 2 A^, xi 2 Xi,
(ii.b) for each j 2 f1; : : : ; ng and each feasible allocation z 2 A^, the set Vj(z)
is closed, convex, and contains 0.
We deflne F^ as the set of allocation-price pairs (z; p) in E^ such that z 2 A^ and
xi 2 »i(p; p ¢ xi) for each i.
Having deflned the notions of allocations and feasible allocations in an economy
E^ , the introduction of economies with imperfect competition is straightforward:
Indeed, following the approach in Section 2 we now deflne a (generalized) economy
with imperfect competition as a triple (E^ ;¡; ('j)nj=1), where
{ E^ is an economy with production externalities,
{ ¡ a mechanism for choice of allocation in E (that is, ¡ = (§1; : : : ;§n; …; F^),
where §j are nonempty strategy sets, j = 1; : : : ; n, and … : § ! F^ is a
correspondence assigning to each strategy array ¾ 2 § = Qnj=1 §j a nonempty
set of feasible allocation-price pairs in E^), and
{ for each j, 'j is a preference correspondence on F^ .
It is easily seen that the deflnition of an equilibrium in (E^ ;¡; ('j)nj=1) may be
deflned exactly as in Deflnition 1.
Definition 5.1 Let (E^ ;¡; ('j)nj=1) be an economy with imperfect competition. An
equilibrium in (E ;¡; ('j)nj=1) is an array (z; p; ¾), where
(1) (z; p) 2 …(¾),
(2) ¾ is a Nash equilibrium of (¡; ('j)
n
j=1) in the sense that there is no j 2
f1; : : : ; ng and (z0; p0) 2 'j(z; p) such that
(z0; p0) 2 …(¿j; ¾¡j)
for some ¿j 2 §j where (¿i; ¾¡j) is the strategy array obtained from ¾ by
replacing ¾j with ¿j.
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The concept of a compensated equilibrium in E^ , on the other hand, difiers slightly
from the corresponding concept deflned in E , since the production externalities play
a role in the behavioral constraints; however, the changes necessary are rather ob-
vious { instead of choosing a proflt maximizing production plan the flrm will be
in equilibrium when no change from the actual production plan will yield greater
proflts. Formally, a compensated equilibrium in E^ is an allocation-price pair (z; p)
such that
(1) (z; p) 2 F^ ,
(2) p ¢ vij • 0 for each j 2 f1; : : : ; ng, i 2 f1; : : : ;mg with µij > 0; and each
vj 2 Vj(z) (recall that vj 2 Rl(m+n) specifles a displacement of allocation).
The reason for our introduction of the production externality, which for a su-
perflcial view is a phenomenon with no relation to imperfect competition, is that
there is nevertheless an intimate connection, as showed by the following theorem.
The theorem states that for any generalized economy with imperfect competition
(E^ ;¡; ('j)nj=1) there is an associated economy with production externalities E^ 0 such
that all equilibria in (E^ ;¡; (`j)nj=1) are compensated equilibria in E^ 0. The initial
economy E^ may or may not have production externalities; however, the associated
economy E^ 0 will typically be one with nontrivial production externalities.
Theorem 5.2 Let (E^ ;¡; ('j)nj=1) be a generalized economy with imperfect competi-
tion satisfying Assumptions 2,6, and 7. Then there is an economy E^ 0 with produc-
tion externalities satisfying Assumptions 2 and 7 such that each allocation-price pair
(z; p) 2 F^ belonging to an equilibrium (z; p; ¾) of (E ;¡; ('j)nj=1) for some ¾ 2 § is
a compensated equilibrium of the economy E^.
Proof: First of all, we deflne the economy E^ 0 with production externalities associated
with (E ;¡; ('j)nj=1). The set A of feasible allocations in E^ 0 coincides with that of
E^ . To deflne the correspondences Vj, we proceed as follows: For each producer j
and each equilibrium (z; p; ¾) of (E^ ;¡; ('j)nj=1), the region of feasible consumption
displacements of j’s shareholders is deflned as the set
Wj(z; p; ¾) =
8<:v 2 Rl flflfl 9¿j 2 §j : v 2 X
i:µij>0
(…i(¿j; ¾¡j)¡ xi)
9=;
(here, …i(¿j; ¾¡j) denotes the component corresponding to bundles of consumer i in
…(¿j; ¾¡j)).
Next, assume that (z0; p0; ¾0) is another equilibrium in E^ such that (z0; p0) 6= (z; p).
If z = z0 then, since (z; p0) and (z; p) both belong to F^ , there is a unique supporting
hyperplane of each set fx0i j x0i »´izi + !ig at zi + !i (by the smoothness property
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given by Assumption 2), and we conclude that p = p0. Thus, z 6= z0. It follows that
either z 6= z0 or (z0; p0) = (z; p). Consequently, the set
Wj(z) = [fWj(z; p; ¾) j (z; p; ¾) equilibrium in (E ;¡; ('j)nj=1)g
is well-deflned whenever z belongs to some equilibrium (z; p; ¾) in (E ;¡; ('j)nj=1).
Now, for each j, j = 1; : : : ; n, we may deflne the production displacement corre-
spondence Vj : A^ ! Rl by
V 0j (z) =
(
TWj(z)(0) if (z; p; ¾) is an equilibrium for some p, ¾,
Rl¡ otherwise
(where, in accordance with our earlier notation, TWj(z)(0) denotes the tangent cone of
Wj(z) at 0). It is easily checked that the economy with production externalities E^ 0 =
((Xi; »´ i; !i)mi=1; A^; (V 0j )nj=1; (µij)mi=1nj=1) deflned by replacing the correspondences Vj
by V 0j , each j, satisfles Assumptions 2 and 7.
Let (z; p) be an allocation-price pair belonging to an equilibrium of E^ . To prove
that (z; p) is a compensated equilibrium of the economy with production externalities
E^ 0 = ((Xi; »´ i; !i)mi=1; A^; (V 0j )nj=1; (µij)mi=1nj=1), we need only show that p ¢ v0j • 0 for
all v0j 2 V 0j (z). Suppose on the contrary that there is some j and v0j 2 V 0j (z) such
that p ¢v0j > 0. Then, by our deflnition of V 0j (z), there is some uj in the tangent cone
of Wj(z), and by compactness of §, in the tangent cone of Wj(z; p; ¾) for (z; p; ¾)
an equilibrium in (E^ ;¡; ('j)nj=1), such that
u 2 X
i:µij>0
[Pi(zi + !i) + !i]:
Reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 3, we get that this is a contradiction, and we
conclude that (z; p) is a compensated equilibrium in E^ 0.
6 Concluding comments
In the present paper, we have presented a general equilibrium model of an economy
with imperfect competition, where the decisions of the flrms are taken with consider-
ation to their efiects in the economy as a whole, given the choices of the other flrms.
In the sense that flrms anticipate the impact of their actions on the allocations and
prices established in the market, the model is one of objective demand.
What has mainly concerned us in this paper was the objective of the flrm acting
on behalf of its shareholders. Since proflt maximization makes little sense in a world
where the actions of the flrms change the price system and thereby the meaning
of the proflt to be maximized, other objectives must be considered, and we have
focussed on two, namely (1) Pareto-improvements for shareholders, and (2) share-
holder real wealth maximization. Our main result was that in case of each of these
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two objectives, the allocations obtained in equilibrium are rather well-behaved; ac-
tually, the flnal outcome in the imperfectly competitive economy looks as if it has
been obtained by the usual competitive mechanism, possibly with a redistribution
of incomes.
The results may be interpreted in several ways; since the flnal allocations are
perhaps too well-behaved as compared with what we expect intuitively, it may be
the case that the objectives of the flrm have not yet been specifled in a proper way;
shareholder unanimity or shareholder real wealth maximization releives the model
of some inconsistencies inherent in other speciflcations of the flrm’s objective to be
encountered in the literature, but are not by themselves very convincing, and if this
holds also for the outcomes resulting from these objectives, they should probably be
reconsidered.
Another line of explanation has to do with the objective demand approach. It
is perhaps not quite reasonable to assume that the flrm can trace the full impact
of its choices on the total economic situation of its shareholders. After all, the
subjective demand approach, specifying what the flrms expect rather than assuming
full knowledge, may be a better approach. Needless to say, some of the problems
of formulating a reasonable objective of the flrm on behalf of the shareholders will
remain.
A third { and much simpler { explanation of the results would be obtained by
pointing to the restrictiveness of the assumptions. In the objective demand model,
the flrm can trace the result for its shareholders of its actions, and if the aggregate
displacement of shareholders’ bundles are not two difierent from displacements of
the chosen production plan, then the equilibria will correspond closely to ordinary
compensated equilibria, as indeed it was shown in Theorems 1 and 3. This how-
ever hinges on an assumption of appropriate closeness of the two alternative sets of
displacements, assumptions which it was not easy to defend in their full generality.
Needless to say, under less restrictive assumptions the equilibria with imperfect com-
petition need not coincide with compensated equilibria of the underlying economy.
The problems with the restrictiveness of these assumptions led us to the abstract
approach in the previous section, showing that the relationship between equilibria
under imperfect competition and compensated equilibria found in the flrst part of the
paper is a particular instance of a much more general result, which on the one hand
does not need the restrictive assumptions, but which on the other is mor abstract,
involving the notion of a production externality. This concept, which plays a certain
unifying role, may well merit a closer study, which among other things could clarify
the equilibrium existence problem. This will however be a theme for future research.
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